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Abstract
Are macro-economists mistaken in ignoring bargaining between spouses? The stationarity,
since the mid 1970s, of married-men￿ s average weekly hours of paid labor suggests that the
inclusion of bargaining between spouses is essential for understanding the labor supply trends
of married women. This paper develops and calibrates to US time-use survey data a simple
macro-style model of marital bargaining, where the allocations depend on equilibrium marriage
and divorce rates. The results suggest that failure to account for bargaining would exaggerate
by roughly 100% the e⁄ect of the closing of the gender gap in wages on the labor supply of
married women. With respect to average paid labor of married couples, the prediction error
from ignoring bargaining would be on the order of 5 hours per week. The model without
bargaining also exaggerates the impact on the decline of marriage resulting from the declining
price of home equipment, from tax reform and from the closing of the gender gap.
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11 Introduction
The economic position of women appears to have improved signi￿cantly relative to that of men
over the last forty years, as re￿ ected in higher wages and stronger career prospects. Figure 1(a),
for instance, shows that the median wages for workers with more than 10 average weekly hours
converged strongly over the period 1975-2001. As Becker (1988) has pointed out, this is a likely
explanation for the decline in marriage rates over the same period, as convergence in market
wages reduces the gains from marriage. Furthermore, to the extent that such changes improve the
bargaining position of women, they are likely to have shifted the allocations within marriage in
favor of the wife.
Neither of these potential impacts of wage convergence have been extensively studied at the
aggregate level, largely because macro models of the household tend to ignore bargaining, and thus
are ill-suited to study questions of intra-household allocation. This paper asks whether both the
decline of marriage and the rise in married-women￿ s labor supply observed in the US over the period
1975-2003 could have been caused in large part by the closing of the gender gap in wages.1 The
analysis relies on a simple model of equilibrium bargaining between spouses that is both tractable
and compatible with the highly aggregated models used in macroeconomics.
While the evidence for reallocations in response to improved outside options is quite strong
at the micro level, macroeconomic models with households usually abstract from such e⁄ects by
assuming that the household acts as an economic agent with a stable utility function. At the
level of the micro data on labor supply, this "unitary" assumption has been shown repeatedly to
be inferior to an approach that allows allocations within the marriage to depend on the economic
position outside the marriage. For instance, Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) ￿nd that the
data rejects the unitary model in favor of the "collective model with distribution factors", which is
essentially an empirical implementation of bargaining between spouses, in the tradition of McElroy
and Horney (1981). The comparative neglect of inter-spouse bargaining by macro-economists is all
the more surprising considering the central role of bargaining in the labor-search literature, and
the obvious parallels between employment and marriage relationships, as discussed in Burdett and
Coles (1999).
From the point of view of empirical analysis, an important advantage of employment relation-
ships is that wages and output are in principle observable, while the utility allocation between
spouses in a marriage is not. The standard practice in the collective-model literature has been to
study paid labor time as a proxy for intra-household allocations; the implicit assumption has been
that paid labor is negatively related to leisure, and that an improvement in the outside option of
the wife will result in an increase in her leisure, and hence a decline in her paid labor. A well-
recognized problem with this approach is that it is only valid if the relative prices and wealth of the
1The beginning and end points of the analysis are ￿xed by the availability of time-use survey data to measure
home production time.
2married household remain constant. Hence the collective-model literature is limited to the study
of e⁄ects that leave these unchanged, such as local variations in divorce laws and in sex ratios of
singles. Analysis of changes in relative wages therefore requires a more structural approach which
can account for income and substitution e⁄ects of wages.
The assumption that time outside of paid work equals leisure time is also unsuitable for histori-
cal comparisons of leisure allocations, because it ignores the time married people spend in household
chores. Indeed Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) have argued that rising labor produc-
tivity at home accounts for roughly half of the increase in married-women￿ s labor supply since
1945, as the time required to accomplish the chores has diminished. Since the main predictions of
bargaining models for labor supply are based on the allocation of leisure, this result suggests that
it would be unwise to make inferences from labor supply without accounting for home-production
time.
A sensible rationalization of macro-economist￿ s neglect of intra-household bargaining might be
that the aggregate e⁄ects of reallocation are likely to be small. Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003) have shown that a standard unitary household model with home production can explain
the rise in married women￿ s labor supply since 1950 in response to either the trend in the female-
male wage ratio or in response to rising productivity at home, as in Greenwood, Seshadri, and
Yorukoglu (2005). In both cases, they ￿nd that calibration to US data implies that married men￿ s
labor supply should have fallen, by somewhere between 5-8 hours weekly. However Figure 1(b)
shows that married men￿ s weekly paid work hours, after a signi￿cant decline in the 1960s, remained
essentially stationary over the 1972-2001 period while women￿ s relative wages were rising. This
suggests that the shortcomings of the unitary model may be signi￿cant at the macro level.
It is possible of course that married men￿ s non-working time is nevertheless declining relative
to that of their wives, if home-production time for married couples is accounted for. In this paper I
show, using American surveys of household time use, that the problem is robust to accounting for
home production. While total working time of married people, both men and women has increased
since 1975, the ratio of husband￿ s non-working time to that of the wife is roughly constant over the
period. This is supported by similar ￿ndings by Bech-Moen (2006) for the US and Norway. Indeed,
Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2007), noting that the leisure ratio is independent of relative wages
across a wide range of countries, despite disparities in relative wages, call this the "iso-leisure"
pattern, and explain it on the basis of social norms.
The argument developed here proceeds in two stages; ￿rst a model of marriage and allocations
is developed. This combines a marriage-equilibrium process similar to that of Chade and Ventura
(2005) with intra-household bargaining as in McElroy and Horney (1981), and a home-production
technology in the spirit of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005).
At ￿rst, the analysis is based on inferences made from special cases of the model. Thus we
establish that the iso-leisure pattern is easily explained by the impact of relative wages on bargaining
position, and hence without reference to social norms. We also show that neither the tax reform
3nor the home technology stories can fully account for the rise in married-women￿ s labor supply,
because they operate largely as income e⁄ects, and hence cannot account for the rise in the wife￿ s
leisure-expenditure share of household income. Finally, we show that while the impact of wage
levels on marriage rates depends on the nature of the home-production technology, the convergence
of relative wages can reduce marriage rates even when the home inputs consist only of time, a
case that makes marriage rates independent of wage levels. While the model developed here is
very stylized, these basic insights are clearly characteristic of the broad class of models used in
macro-economics; the most important assumption being that household utility is within the CES
class and separable across goods.
These inferences leave open the essentially quantitative questions: does intra-household bar-
gaining change our understanding of the shifts in marriage rates, aggregate labor, and the labor
supply of married women? To answer these questions, the model is equipped with a standard CES
home-production technology, logarithmic preferences, and a stochastic process for marriage quality.
Values for wages, non-labor income and tax rates are fed in from survey data. The model is then
calibrated to match time allocations and marriage rates for 1975 and 2003. This benchmark version
of the model is then compared with its "unitary" version, in which the bargaining solution is held
constant, to make it comparable to the standard macro approach. Finally, the model is subjected
to a series of computational experiments in which all variables but one are kept at their 1975 levels;
these experiments are carried out in both the unitary and bargaining versions of the model.
From the point of view of matching the iso-leisure fact, the key feature of the model developed
here is that the bargaining position of the spouses depends on the marriage-market equilibrium,
which is in turn a function of the relative wage. This feature is essential for reconciling the standard
macro model with the main empirical result, that the ratio of married women￿ s non-working time
to that of husbands was stationary over the period 1975-2003. Without bargaining, the model
predicts a 27% decline in this ratio, in response to the shrinking of the gender gap in wages.
However in the equilibrium with bargaining, the rise in the relative wage causes married couples to
allocate a higher leisure share to the wives, o⁄setting the higher price of female leisure. The most
important force is the closing of the gender gap in wages, which generates a 7-hour increase in the
wife￿ s paid labor. This is more than simply a reallocation between husband and wife; the average
labor supply of married couples increases by 2.5 weekly hours, about 40% of the increase observed
since the 1970s.
The model also explains a decline in the marriage rates of single women from 9.1% to 6.4%
per year; about 60% of the total decline in marriage over the period 1975-2003. Income and wage
growth on its own can explain 50% of the observed decline in the marriage rate, while convergence
of wages accounts for 20%.
The quantitative results also take into account two other topical sources of change: improvement
in home productivity over time and changes to the marginal tax schedule due to ￿scal reforms over
the period. Greenwood and Guner (2004) explain the marriage decline over the longer period since
41945 as the result of a continuous decline in the cost of running a household, relative to the mean
wage. They identify two forces driving this change: the rise in average wages, and the decline in
the price of home equipment. In the current paper, we ￿nd that the fall in the equipment price
generates only a 2-hour increase, about 20% of the total change in married women￿ s labor supply.
This is because we use the time allocation of single-person households to identify the role of home
equipment; since the time allocated to home production by singles has not declined very much over
time, this limits the role of the price decline of home equipment.
The impact of tax reform on married-women￿ s labor supply has been widely studied; the mar-
ginal tax schedule has ￿ attened considerably since the 1970s, and this appears to have had signi￿-
cant e⁄ects on married-women￿ s labor supply, as documented by Eissa (1995). A seminal paper,
Prescott (2004) conjectures that this accounts for the rise in female labor supply after 1986. In
the current paper, the quantitative experiments suggest that e⁄ects of tax reform alone could have
accounted for roughly 20% of the rise in married-women￿ s labor supply, consistent with the ￿nding
of Kaygusuz (2010), and about 26% of the rise in average labor supply of married couples.
How important is bargaining for explaining these trends in labor and marriage? The results
show that bargaining sharply reduces the role of wage growth in the decline in marriage. When
bargaining in the model is shut down, income and wage growth alone can account for the entire
decline in marriage rates since 1975. The e⁄ects of the equipment-price trend or the tax reforms
on marriage rates are relatively small in the benchmark model; ; the former reduces marriage rates
by 2%, while the e⁄ect of the tax reform is to increase marriage rates very slightly, by about
4%. However when the bargaining between spouses is shut down, these e⁄ects are transformed;
equipment prices drive marriage rates down 2 percentage points, and taxes by 1.6 points. It is
much easier to explain marriage decline without bargaining, but the sources of change appear to
be quite di⁄erent.
In regards to labor supply, the model without bargaining is far more responsive to the relative
wage trend; not only do wive￿ s paid hours increase by an additional 10 hours per week, but average
hours of married couples increases by an additional 2.5 hours , about 50% of the total increase
observed since 1975.
These results suggest that it is potentially misleading to abstract from bargaining, even at the
most aggregate level. It is to be expected that bargaining would be critical for understanding the
impact of changes in relative wages, though the size of these e⁄ects on labor supply by sex has
never been measured. However the role of bargaining turns out to be quite large even with respect
to the e⁄ects of taxation and economic growth on marriage and labor supply. Even the impact of
growth on aggregate labor turns out to be sensitive to the bargaining assumption.
The model in the current paper can be seen as a simpli￿ed version of the marriage-market
models of Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000) and Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003),
but there the focus is on heterogeneity in matching and fertility decisions, which limits the analysis
to one or two marriage opportunities per lifetime. An in￿nite horizon model with many matching
5and fertility opportunities has been developed by Kennes and Knowles (2008), but that model
abstracts from the time-allocation problem of married households. Another paper that spells out
the implications of the collective model at the macro level is Lise and Seitz (2005), who ￿nd that
accounting for trends in intra-household inequality substantially reduces the apparent increase in
consumption inequality over the last 30 years.
2 Trends in Time Allocation
For distinguishing di⁄erent versions of the household model the response of total work time, in-
cluding unpaid work, to changes in relative wages of men and women is more useful than that of
paid working time. What is missing from the standard macro data sets therefore are numbers for
then changes in unpaid work. The goal of this section is to document patterns in non-working time
by studying these changes. The strategy is to use the CPS to document the trends in paid labor
and relative wages and show that the trends are driven by the behavior of married people. Since
unpaid work time is not documented in the CPS, we then turn to time-use surveys and show that
mean paid work hours for married couples in these data sets are very similar over the years to the
numbers in the CPS.
2.1 Paid-Labor Supply Trends: CPS
Figure 1, which shows the labor-supply trend by sex and marital status, the trend in relative
wages, and the per-capita hours trend, is based on the March Supplement of the CPS, from 1962
to 2006. To ￿lter out the role of cyclical ￿ uctuations, Table 1 averages the data over several
years. The population is restricted to civilians age 18 to 65, a standard de￿nition of working-age
adulthood. Younger people are likely to be constrained by compulsory schooling, and older people
by mandatory retirement, social security rules, and disabilities. The weekly hours variable is the
reported hours worked last week. 2
For married women it is clear that average weekly hours of paid labor increased steadily, from
an average of 11.8 in the 1962-66 period to 22.97 in 1994-2001. For single women, there is no
trend, hours ￿ uctuate between 22 and 26 over these periods. For single men, the pattern is similar,
a stationary series that ￿ uctuates between 24 and 28 weekly hours. For married men, hours are
essentially constant at 36 from 1976-2003.
The wage trend shown in Figure 1(b) is computed by dividing annual earnings by annualized
hours worked, as given by the hours worked last week response. To avoid noise from people with
low hours, the sample for this calculation is restricted to people who worked at least 10 hours.
Average hours worked per person in 1971 was 24.7, slightly lower than in 1962. Figure 1(c)
shows that, over the next 28 years, average hours rose steadily to 29.3 in 2000, an increase of nearly
18% .
2Similar results obtain if instead we multiply usual weekly hours by number of weeks worked.
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cohorts of married men and women. Those for women rise signi￿cantly with each successive cohort;
by 3 hours at age 30 when we move from the 1930s to the 1940s cohorts, by an additional 7 hours
to the 1950s cohort, and by another 3 hours from the 1950s to the 1960s cohort. In contrast, the
age-hours pro￿les of married men are essentially identical over all cohorts. This also means that
there is no question here of substitution of labor time across the lifecycle in response to changes in
married women￿ s roles: the shape of the men￿ s pro￿les do not change systematically as we move
across cohorts.
It may be interesting to explore the possibility that the lack of trend in husband￿ s hours is
driven by con￿ icting trends between households where the wife works and those where she doesn￿ t,
or by a rise in household where the wife works. In the appendix, Figure A1 shows that for wives
aged less than 50 years, husband￿ s hours are stationary after 1974 for both household types. In
all cases, husbands work more in households where the wife is also working. For households where
the wife is older than 50, there is decline in husband￿ s hours until 1984 for households where the
wife is not working, and stationarity thereafter. The stationarity of husband￿ s paid working hours
therefore holds even when age and labor force status are accounted for, except that, for the oldest
group, the stationary period starts somewhat later.
Another possibility is that paid work hours are ￿xed by custom at a rigid number, such as 40
hours per week. Figure A2(a) shows that indeed at all age groups, the median in the 1990s is 40,
and for men older than 25, the 25th percentile is also close to 40. However the model implies that
if this constraint is binding, the household can respond by adjusting unpaid work hours, which are
presumably from institutional rigidities that operate in the work place.
2.2 Non-Working time: The Time-Use Surveys
To track trends in unpaid work and hence non-working time, we follow the existing literature in
relying on a collection of cross-sectional time-use surveys beginning in 1965 and culminating in the
￿rst wave of the American Time Use Survey in 2003. These appear to be the only representative
source of data on home production time apart from cooking and cleaning, notably child care and
shopping time, as well as unpaid work time and leisure activities. This is important because
it is well-known (see Gershuny and Robinson (1988) ) that married-couple￿ s allocation of home-
production time has shifted since the 1960s, with husbands apparently bearing a larger share of
house work than in the past.
Because of inconsistent design over the years, comparison of variables from the time-use surveys
requires standardization of activities into broader categories. Results for this type of exercise
are reported by Robinson and Godbey (1997) and Aguiar and Hurst (2007); from the regression
methods of the latter, for instance, we learn that, over the period 1965-2003, leisure for men
increased by roughly 6 to 9 hours per week (driven by a decline in market work hours) and for
women by roughly 4 to 8 hours per week. Robinson and Godbey (1997) also ￿nds that women￿ s
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a closer look at the data is warranted for three reasons. First, while the existing results concern
the population as a whole, we need to examine the time allocation of married people. Second, the
results reported in previous papers concern trends since 1965, with little information on the period
that is critical for the analysis here, 1975 to the end of the 1990s. Finally, while the labor literature
analyses trends in leisure, de￿ned as time in speci￿ed non-work activities such as attending social
functions or watching TV, in the macro literature it is standard to divide discretionary time into
paid work, home-production and non-working time.
Of the 168 hours available each week, it is assumed that the minimum time required for sleep
and personal care is 50 hours, which turns out to be the ￿rst percentile in the pooled data for 1965,
1975, 1985 and 2003. The exact number assigned to this minimum time is without consequence
for the analysis. The important point is that time spent in sleep and personal care includes a
discretionary component, as documented by Biddle and Hamermesh (1990). This paper assumes
discretionary time is allocated between paid work and unpaid work; the residual is taken to be
non-working time. The variables making up each of these categories are taken from the de￿nitions
of Aguiar and Hurst (2007).
Table 2(a) reports the time allocation of married people aged 18-65 according to these surveys.
The table shows that working time did decline over the longer period since 1965, but all of this
decline was before the period of interest begins in 1975. Since then the working time of both
married men and women has increased, due to a rise in unpaid work for men and in paid work
for women. The main point however is that while non-working time has declined slightly for both
husbands and wives since 1975, the ratio of married women￿ s non-working time to that of married
men has remained stable; 1.073 in 1975, 1.073 in 2003. Even after accounting for unpaid working
time therefore, married women￿ s non-working time is not responding relative wages in the way
predicted by the unitary model.
Part (b) of the table shows that unpaid working time is composed largely of time spent cooking
and cleaning in the case of the women; while this component has increased 50% for men, it was
still only 3.33 hours weekly on average in 2003, compared to 14.9 hours for wives. Commuting and
Job-related time declined for both men and women, even though time in paid work did not. The
2.5 hour decline for men in time spent in Job-related was largely o⁄set by small increases in other
categories. One category that increased for both men and women was child care (excluding time
spent playing with children); the e⁄ect is small however relative to the other changes, so it does
not appear worth worrying how time spent in this category might be mis-measured. Overall, men
in 2003 were spending two more hours in "Other home production" per week, and one more in
"Cooking and Other Indoor Chores" than in 1975. The lack of trend in relative non-working time
therefore is robust to how we treat child-care time.
Table 2(c) shows that while non-working time remained constant over the 1975-2003 period,
there was a small reallocation of this time from leisure activities to personal care for wives and
8from personal care to leisure activities for husbands. Thus married women￿ s relative time spent in
leisure activities does fall, but non-working time does not. Could this be driven by the increase in
women￿ s paid work? This would be hard to reconcile with the three hour decline in men￿ s personal
care time, given that their paid time declined less than 5%. Indeed, when the sample is censored
to exclude the top percentile of market labor, the table shows no trend in men￿ s market labor, but
the fall of personal care time remains unchanged. As Biddle and Hamermesh (1990) ￿nd that the
elasticity of sleep time with respect to paid work hours is signi￿cantly negative, and sleep is the
main component of personal care time, the reallocation of non-working time for women appears to
have the wrong sign for their rise in personal care to be driven by rising labor force participation
of wives. Hence, it appears that this is indeed a relabeling or reallocation of non-working time.
Finally, Table 3 shows that conditioning on observables such as age, education and labor force
status does not explain the stationarity of relative non-working time. The relative wages of the
sub-samples are shown in Table 3(a), which gives the female/male wage ratios for people working
10 hours more per week. For the 25-54 age group, the ratio of mean wages rises from 0.6 in the
1967-74 period to 0.76 in the 1995-2000 period. For the 55-65 age group, the wage ratio is the
same in both periods. For those with less than a bachelor￿ s degree (BA), the ratio evolves from
0.6 to 0.76; for those with a BA or more , the trend is weaker, from 0.66 to 0.72, falling back to
0.69 in the 2000-2006 period. Table 3(b) shows that, over the 1975-2003 period, only one group of
husbands gets an increase in relative non-working time; those with educational attainment equal
to 12 years, the equivalent to a high-school diploma. The wife￿ s relative non-working time falls
in this case from 1.14 to 1.06. For all other groups, wife￿ s relative non-working time increases or
stays constant. Most signi￿cantly, when the sample is restricted to spouses who are working, the
wife￿ s relative non-working time increases from 0.97 to 1.04. The e⁄ect appears to be strongest
among younger couples; the increase for married people aged 25-55 is from 0.94 to 1.04. Among
the 55-70 age group the rise in wife￿ s relative non-working time is much weaker, from 1.01 to 1.06,
which may be due to the fact that the wage change is much smaller for this group as shown in
Table 3, from 0.66 to 0.69. Far from accounting for the failure of husband￿ s non-working time to
rise, the observables seem to exacerbate the issue by revealing that in fact it is the wife￿ s relative
non-working time that is increasing within most groups.
Could it be that there is a rigidity, perhaps due to social norms, that restricts married couples
from freely adjusting non-working time? It is generally di¢ cult to examine this in the time-use
surveys because they sample individuals, rather than households. However in 1985, the sample
includes 531 married couples. Figure A2(b) shows the husband-wife ratios of nonworking time for
this sample. While it is clear that the distribution is centered around one, considerable dispersion
exists. A similar result for Australia, Germany and the US is obtained by Burda, Hamermesh, and
Weil (2007). While analyzing the source of this dispersion is outside the scope of the current paper,
it seems to indicate that there is no lack of ￿ exibility in the allocation of non-working time.
93 A Model of Marriage and Labor Supply
This section describes a simple equilibrium marriage model. We ￿rst work out the e¢ cient alloca-
tions, taking as given the Pareto weight the household puts on each spouse. Holding these weights
￿xed corresponds to the standard unitary model used in macroeconomics. We then extend the
model by nesting a bargaining theory of the Pareto weights in which the weights depend on the
value of leaving the marriage. Finally, we work out these values by computing the equilibrium
marriage rates depend on full income by marital status. A simple example of the model is then
fully worked out to show how the main features determine labor supply.
The main non-standard simpli￿cation is that home goods appear as a minimum-consumption
constraint, and do not enter the utility function. A more standard approach would be to treat home
goods as arguments in the utility function. This feature is motivated by simplicity, as it allows
the model to be calibrated in separate chunks. It is a simple way of matching the fact that there
is virtually no fall in average home hours over the period 1975-2003, by marital status; indeed for
single men, home hours rose slightly, while for couples the rise in husband￿ s hours nearly o⁄sets the
decline in that of the wives.
3.1 Household Structure
There is a large population with equal numbers of two sexes i 2 fH;Wg, who are otherwise ex
ante identical and live through an in￿nite succession of discrete periods. At the beginning of each
period, people are either married or single. Married people learn their realization of a match-quality
shock ", choose allocations, and then choose whether to stay together or to divorce. If they divorce,
they must then wait until the next period to meet a new potential spouse. This shock has an
unconditional distribution ￿; realizations are independent across pairings, but may be persistent
within. Let the conditional distribution be F ("0;"): The cost of divorce is dc ￿ 0:
All people who enter the period as singles are randomly paired with a single of the opposite sex.
The new pairs then learn their match quality ", choose allocations and decide whether to marry.
After the marriage decisions, all married couples choose their time allocations over market and
house work, and get utility from leisure, match quality and consumption of household earnings.
Each agent i has a time endowment of one unit of time, which is allocated across three competing
uses: leisure li, work outside the household, ni and home work hi. There is a time cost tn per unit
of outside work:3 The time constraint for each spouse i is:
li + ni (1 + tn) + hi = 1
The consumption expenditure of a single household is cS
i , while that of married couples is
the sum over public consumption cP and private consumption cM
H + cM
W:For singles, there is no
distinction between private and public consumption.
3The empirical analysis reported in Table 4 shows that unpaid job-related time is an important component of
unpaid work, and that the average of this across sex-marital subsamples is proportional to paid working hours.
10There is a home good that is produced using inputs of housework time (hH;hW) from each
spouse; as well as a ￿ ow of home equipment eq, according to a production function G: Married
couples are constrained to produce a minimum level gM of the home good, while for singles the
constraint is gS
i .
Preferences of individuals over consumption and leisure are represented by the discounted sum:
1 X
j=0
￿j ￿
um
i
￿
cP
t+j;ci;t+j;li;t+j
￿
+ JM
i;t+j"i;t+j
￿
where m indicates marital status and JM
i;t+j is an indicator for marriage. The period utility
function um
i
￿
cP;ci;li
￿
, depends on household consumption of a public good cP, the private con-
sumption ci of person i, non-working time li.
3.2 Markets, Prices and Taxation
A unit of outside labor ni by a worker of sex i produces wi units of a consumption good, which is
consumed within the period. Both the wage e wi and the work cost tn are parameters which evolve
exogenously. Households also have some endowed non-labor income, equal to ynl
M for married
couples and ynl
i ; i 2 fH;Wg for singles. Income is taxed according to a progressive tax schedule
that distinguishes between married and single households. The tax bill of a household of type i
with gross (taxable) income Yi is given by Ti (Yi).The household buys home equipment eq at price
pq per unit.
3.3 E¢ cient Allocations in the Married Household
The married household is assumed to maximize a welfare function consisting of a weighted sum
of the welfare of each spouse i 2 fH;Wg, corresponding to the husband and wife. The state of a
marriage is given by the quality shock ":There is no commitment, so the decisions made by a new
marriage are the same as those of an existing marriage in the same state. Since allocations are
assumed to be e¢ cient, we can represent them as the solution to the household planner￿ s problem
where ￿i is the Pareto weight on agent i:
Since home goods do not enter the utility function, the home-production constraint always
binds:
G(eq;hH;hW) = gm (1)
Since the allocation does not a⁄ect continuation values, conditional on ￿i, we can write the e¢ cient
allocation as the solution to a static problem. Noting that ￿W + ￿H = 1, we have set ￿H = ￿, so
that ￿W = 1 ￿ ￿:Given ￿, The married household maximizes:
f￿u(cP;cH;lH) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(cP;cW;lW)g
subject to the budget constraint:
cP + cH + cW + peq + T
￿
Y T
M
￿
￿ Y T
M
11, where taxable income Y T
M ￿ wWnW +wHnH +ynl
M; to the home-production constraint (1), and to
the time constraints, as well as the usual non-negativity constraints on consumption and leisure.
Let the multiplier on the budget constraint be ￿:Suppose that we take the marginal and average
tax rates, TM and TA, respectively, as given. The optimality conditions are
￿uc (cP;cH;lH) = ￿
￿ul (cP;cH;lH) = ￿wH
1 ￿ TM
1 + tn
for the husband and
(1 ￿ ￿)uc (cP;cW;lW) = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)ul (cP;cW;lW) = ￿wW
1 ￿ TM
1 + tn
for the wife. With respect to the public good, the optimality condition is:
uP (cP;ci;li) = ￿
3.3.1 Leisure Allocations
The ￿rst-order conditions imply the marginal utility of leisure is inversely proportional to the
relative wage, holding ￿ constant:
ulH
ulW
=
wH
wW
￿
1 ￿ ￿
. Hence when the relative wage increases, then concavity of the utility function implies relative
leisure must fall. This is the theoretical motivation of this paper. To make this into a quantitative
statement, we need only specify a utility function. With log utility, relative leisure is itself inversely
proportional to the relative wage,
lW
lH
=
wH
wW
1 ￿ ￿
￿
. Blau and Kahn (1997) report that the average wages of women working full time rose, as
a fraction of men￿ s, from 0.60 to 0.76 over the period 1975 to 1995. If the weight ￿ remained
constant, then the relative leisure e l = lW
lH for average wife should have decreased by 18%:
e l(0:76)
e l(0:6)
=
0:6
0:76
= 0:82
If instead each agent had additively separable CES utility:
u(ci;li) =
c1￿￿
i ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿
l1￿￿
i ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
, the ￿rst-order condition for relative leisure would be similar:
lW
lH
=
￿
wH
wW
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿1=￿
12. With ￿ > 1, as is usually assumed in the macro literature, the result is that the wage elasticity
of relative leisure is reduced from 1 to 1=￿: Setting ￿ = 2; the prediction is that married women￿ s
leisure should have declined 9.5%, relative of that of their husbands, an e⁄ect on the order of 6 hours.
Therefore generalizing the utility function to the CRRA class, as used in the macro literature, does
not make the iso-leisure problem go away. Note that these implications are independent of the tax
function and the home-production technology. With joint taxation, the relative wage of husband
and wife is una⁄ected, so any increase in wife￿ s labor supply induced by changes in the tax schedule
should leave the leisure ratio unchanged. Since women￿ s wages are rising relative to men￿ s the tax
story is inadequate because it does not supply an o⁄setting e⁄ect to prevent women￿ s leisure from
falling.
With log utility, it is easy to see that if the solution is interior, then labor income is invariant
to ￿: This is very useful for future results. Using the budget constraint, we can de￿ne full income
as
Y F
M =
￿
wW (1 ￿ hW) + wH (1 ￿ hH)
1 + tn
+ ynl
M ￿ kM
￿￿
1 ￿ TA￿
, where kM =
p
1￿TAeq is the e⁄ective cost of equipment. The optimal consumption expenditure,
net of taxes, with log utility is given by
xc =
1
1 + ￿ 1￿TA
1￿TM
Y F
M
, and the optimal leisure expenditure by
^ wM
H lH + ^ wM
WlW =
￿
1 + ￿ 1￿TA
1￿TM
Y F
M
, where ^ wM
i = 1￿TM
1￿tn . The distortion induced by the progressiveness of the tax is 1￿TA
1￿TM ; which is
increasing in income. With a linear tax rate, this ratio equals one and we are left with the familiar
constant-expenditure-share property.
We can write the indirect utility (conditional on full income Y F
M) from marriage each period,
as:
UM
i
￿
Y F
M;wi
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)ln￿i + "
, where
UM
i
￿
Y F
M; ^ wi
￿
= (1 + ￿)ln
"
1
1 + ￿ 1￿TA
1￿TM
Y F
M
#
￿ ￿ ln ^ wM
i + KM
KM = ￿ln￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ln￿
The analogous results for CES utility are shown in the appendix.
3.4 Single-Person Households
For single people of sex i with non-labor income ynl
i , the household problem is
13max
n;h;eq
n
u
￿
wini + ynl
i ￿ peq ￿ T
￿
wini + ynl
i
￿
;1 ￿ ni (1 + tn) ￿ hi
￿
+ ￿[G(eq;hi) ￿ g]
o
Holding the tax rates constant, we can de￿ne full income from the solution to the home pro-
duction problem:
Y S
i =
￿
ynl
i +
wi
1 + tn
(1 ￿ hi)
￿￿
1 ￿ TA￿
￿ peq
The single household chooses l i;ci;ni;hi;eq to maximize the utility function u(ci;li) subject to the
budget constraint
ci = wini + ynl
i ￿ peq ￿ T
￿
wini + ynl
i
￿
, the home production constraint G(eq;hi) = g, and the time constraint
li = 1 ￿ ni (1 + tn) ￿ hi
ni =
1 ￿ li ￿ hi
1 + tn
, where the time cost of work equals tn:
Setting the average tax rate to TA, the budget constraint, in terms of leisure and home time,
the budget constraint is:
ci =
￿
wi
1 ￿ li ￿ hi
1 + tn
+ ynl
i
￿￿
1 ￿ TA￿
￿ peq
With log utility the expenditure share of leisure depends on the wedge between marginal and
average tax rates:
wi
1 + tn
li = Y S
i (p;wi;hi;eq)
￿
1￿TM
1￿TA + ￿
, where Y S
i is the full income of singles:
Y S
i ￿
￿
wi
1 ￿ hi
1 + tn
+ ynl
i
￿￿
1 ￿ TA￿
￿ peq
When marginal and average rates are equal, expenditure share becomes the familiar constant ￿
1+￿:
The indirect utility is
US
i (wi;Y s
i ) = (1 + ￿)lnY s
i ￿ (1 + ￿)ln
￿
1 ￿ TM
1 ￿ TA + ￿
￿
+ ln
1 ￿ TM
1 ￿ TA ￿ ￿ ln
wi
1 + tn
+ ￿ ln￿
The analogous results for CES utility are shown in the appendix.
3.5 Determination of ￿
Our theory of ￿ is that it is a function of the gains from marriage, relative to divorce, as in a
wide range of papers from McElroy and Horney (1981) to Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) to
Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003). We will consider the Egalitarian bargaining solution,
14because for special cases it renders the model tractable, so that we can solve for equilibrium
allocations and marriage decisions. The Egalitarian solution is also more elastic than the Nash
solution, which reduces the distance from the unitary assumption required for the calibration to
match the iso-leisure fact.
Let UM
i
￿
Y F
M; ^ wi;￿i
￿
+" represents the indirect utility ￿ ow to agent i from a marriage where ￿i
is the Pareto weight on agent i; and " is the current realization of a random variable representing
the quality of the marriage. Let V M
i indicate the value to a person of sex i of being married and
V S
i that of being single. Let ￿ represent the CDF of "; this is the distribution from which quality
is drawn for new matches. Let F ("0j") represent the conditional distribution for ongoing matches.
Standard arguments show that there exist thresholds
￿
"M;"D￿
such that marriage occurs only
if " > "M and divorce only if " < "D. If we take ￿i as ￿xed, the value to spouse i of being in the
marriage is
V M
i (￿i;") = UM
i (￿i;w;Y ) +
Z
"D
"0F
￿
"0;"
￿
d"0
+￿
￿
F
￿
"Dj"
￿￿
V S
i ￿ dc
￿
+
￿
1 ￿ F
￿
"Dj"
￿￿
V M
i
￿
￿0
i;w"
￿￿
(2)
Similarly, for singles, let the indirect utility ￿ ow be US
i , so that we can write the value of being
single as:
V S
i = US
i + ￿
￿
￿
￿
"M￿
V S
i +
Z
"M
V M
i (￿i;")d￿(")
￿
(3)
De￿ne the gains from marriage, relative to divorce, as
WD
i (￿i;") = V M
i (￿i;") ￿ V S
i ￿ dc
De￿nition 1 A bargaining solution B (WH;WW) is a mapping from a pair of functions WD
H ();WD
W ()
to a Pareto weight ￿ on spouse H:
Notice that this de￿nition allows B to map on to any Pareto-optimal allocation. The main
restriction relative to the set of all possible bargaining solutions, is that solutions depend only on
the gains from marriage. This is quite standard in the literature on household labor supply, and
is consistent with the result of Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) and others who ￿nd that
labor supply of married couples responds to variables ("distribution factors") that a⁄ect the value
of single life, such as divorce rules, or the sex ratio of singles.
The Egalitarian solution is de￿ned as the ￿ that equalizes the gains from marriage. Hence ￿E
solves:
WD
H
￿
￿E;"
￿
= WD
W
￿
1 ￿ ￿E;"
￿
.
153.5.1 Example
Consider the log example where the indirect utilities of married and single people are as in the
previous examples. Suppose that there are no divorce costs, and that " is iid; the gains from
marriage are then equal to the di⁄erence in indirect utility. With the egalitarian solution,
￿H =
1
1 + e qae yb
, where
e y =
Y s
W
Y s
H
; e q =
qW
qH
;a =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
and b =
1 + ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
:
. This says that the bargaining position of spouse j is summarized by the product of her relative
taste for single life and her relative full income as a single. Notice that " does not enter; this is
because with the Egalitarian solution, factors that are common to both spouses drop out of the
determination of ￿: 4
Relative leisure is a function of the Pareto weight ￿; which depends on the relative wage through
the ratio of full incomes when single. For the Egalitarian case, relative leisure is given by:
e l =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
1
e w
= e qae yb
e w
. Hence the elasticity of relative leisure with respect to the relative wage is:
@ ln
@ ln e w
e l =
@
@ ln e w
￿
ln
e yb
e w
￿
= b
@ ln e y
@ ln e w
￿ 1 (4)
This implies the elasticity of relative leisure with respect to the relative wage can be positive
or negative. The model can therefore match the iso-leisure fact when b = 1:
3.6 Marriage-market Equilibrium
The marriage threshold "M sets the marriage surplus to zero, relative to single life. Similarly the
divorce threshold "D sets the marriage surplus to zero, relative to divorce. The wedge between the
two is a function of the divorce cost dc:These two thresholds de￿ne the market-clearing conditions
in the marriage market.
De￿nition. A recursive equilibrium of the marriage market with progressive tax functions Ti (y)
and a given bargaining solution concept B (WH;WW); consists of a pair of thresholds
￿
"M;"D￿
, a
Pareto weight ￿; and for each household type i 2 fM;SW;SMg; tax rates
￿
TM
i ;TA
i
￿
and value
functions
￿
V M
i (￿i;");V S
i
￿
such that:
4Note also that an increase in the tax penalty on wive￿ s earnings causes ￿ to increase, because otherwise the
increase in wive￿ s leisure would increase her gains from marriage, violating the principle that equilibrium gains from
marriage are determined by the relative utility of single life, which is una⁄ected by the tax.
161. The value functions solve the Bellman equations (??,3) for men and women, given the prices
fw;y;pqg and thresholds
2. The threshold "M sets to zero the gains from marriage, relative to remaining single, while "D
sets to zero the gains from marriage, relative to divorce .
3. The allocations implied by the Pareto weight ￿ equal those generated by the bargaining
solution: ￿ = B (WH;WW), where Wi represents the gain of spouse i from marriage, relative
to divorce.
4. The optimal allocations generate, for each household type i; a level of taxable household
income yi such that T0
i (yi) = TM
i ; and Ti (yi) = yiTA
i
3.7 Comparative Statics of Marriage: A Special Case
To compute the marriage/divorce thresholds, we de￿ne the minimum value ￿M
i (") as the Pareto
weight that leaves a single agent of sex i indi⁄erent between marriage and single life: Wi
￿
￿M
i ;"
￿
=
0: Similarly we can de￿ne ￿D
i (") as the value that leaves a married agent of sex i indi⁄erent
between marriage and divorce. The surplus equals the sum of the gains Wj
￿
￿j;"
￿
, so if we can
compute ￿M
i (") then we can ￿nd "M by solving ￿M
W
￿
"M￿
+ ￿M
H
￿
"M￿
= 1: The divorce threshold
"D is computed in a similar way. Of course if " is iid then "D = "M ￿ 2dc. There are two
reasons therefore in the model, why divorce rates are lower than 1￿￿M; positive divorce costs, and
persistence of ":
In this section we consider a simpli￿ed version of the model in which all of these functions can
be derived explicitly. The simpli￿cations consist of assuming egalitarian bargaining with log utility,
that marriage quality " is iid, and that the divorce costs are zero. With these assumptions, we can
solve the model easily because the dynamic components to the gains from marriage are equal for
husband and wife, and so cancel out in the bargaining solution..
What matters then is the e⁄ect of marriage on ￿ ow utilities. Excluding the marital share and
the match quality, this is:
￿i = UM
i ￿ Us
i
= KMS + (1 + ￿)ln
Y M
Y S
i
￿ lnqi ￿ ￿ ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿i￿
where KMS = ￿ln￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ ￿). The minimum Pareto weight ￿
i is therefore:
a =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
andb =
1 + ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
i = K
￿
Y M
Y S
i
￿p1
q
p0
i "￿p0
17where K = exp
￿
KMS
1￿￿+￿
￿
;p0 = ￿
1￿￿+￿, and p1 = 1+￿
1￿￿+￿: At the marriage threshold "M, it must be
that ￿
W
￿
"M￿
+ ￿
H
￿
"M￿
= 1: This implies that the marriage threshold is given by
"M = K
1
p0
"￿
Y S
M
￿p1 q
p0
M +
￿
Y S
W
￿p1 q
p0
W
(Y M)
p1
#1=p0
.If the joy of single life were equal across sexes, then threshold would proportional to it:
"M = K
1
p0 q
"￿
Y S
M
￿p1 +
￿
Y S
W
￿p1
(Y M)
p1
#1=p0
. This implies the higher is the income of singles, the lower the marriage rate. The e⁄ect of ￿ is to
reduce the elasticity of marriage rates to relative income. When ￿ = 0 we see that what matters
for the marriage threshold is the ratio of income when single to income when married:
"M = K
1
p0 q
￿
Y S
M + Y S
W
Y M
￿1=p0
, where the elasticity is determined by 1=p0 = 1+￿
￿ > 1:
How do assumptions about home production determine the e⁄ect of wages on marriage rates?
Suppose that ￿ = 0 and that full income is composed of wage income, net of a ￿xed cost   > 0 of
running a household and let the female wage be a given fraction ￿ of the male wage.
Since the marriage rate is increasing in the ratio of income while married to income as singles,
it is increasing in   :
Y M
Y S
M + Y S
W
=
wM (1 + ￿) ￿  
wM (1 + ￿) ￿ 2 
Furthermore, as average wages increase, marriage rates will also fall:
@
@wM
￿
Y M
Y S
M + Y S
W
￿
=
1
(wM (1 + ￿) ￿ 2 )
￿
1 ￿
wM (1 + ￿) ￿  
wM (1 + ￿) ￿ 2 
￿
< 0
This is e⁄ect is central to the explanation by Greenwood and Guner (2004) of the decline of marriage
since WW2.
Now suppose that the ￿xed cost is actually a time cost, and that it doesn￿ t matter which spouse
does the work. If   < 1 and the wife￿ s time is cheaper at the margin than the husband￿ s, we can
write
Y M
Y S
M + Y S
W
=
1 + ￿(1 ￿  )
(1 ￿  )(1 + ￿)
> 1
In this world, wage growth has no e⁄ect on marriage rates. What about a rise in ￿?
@
@￿
￿
Y M
Y S
M + Y S
W
￿
=
1
1 + ￿
￿
1 ￿
1 + ￿(1 ￿  )
(1 ￿  )(1 + ￿)
￿
< 0
So the closing of the gender gap in wages reduces marriage rates, even in a world where average
wages have no e⁄ect. The size of this e⁄ect is unknown, but will be larger, relative to the e⁄ect of
average wages, the easier it is to substitute equipment for time in the home-production function.
184 Home Technology
We assume a home production technology that is Cobb-Douglas in equipment and labor. Letting
H be the labor input, and eq the ￿ ow of equipment services, the technology is represented as
G(H;eq) = e1￿￿
q H￿
We would like a speci￿cation for technology that allows for zero inputs of labor, so that both
singles and married can be modeled as operating the same technology. We represent this with a
speci￿cation for the e⁄ective labor input of married couples that is CES in the individual inputs,
and allows for changes in relative productivity:
H (hW;h H) =
h
zWh
1￿￿
W + zHh
1￿￿
H
i1=(1￿￿)
For singles of sex i 2 fW;Hg, e⁄ective labor input is H (hi;0) = zihi:
The following results are easily demonstrated.
Lemma 2 The optimal homework time of singles of sex i is
hS
i (wi;p) =
gS
i
zi
￿
p
wi
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿￿
Lemma 3 The cost of home production for singles is
wihi + peq =
￿
gS
i =z
￿h
w￿
ip1￿￿
i
kS
, where kS =
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿1￿￿
+
￿1￿￿
￿
￿￿
:
If we de￿ne a conversion factor Am between male and female labor then the married results are
particularly simple. Let
AM ￿
￿
wH
wW
zW
zH
￿￿￿
Lemma 4 For married couples, the optimal ratio of working time is given by
hW
hH
=
￿
wH
wW
zW
zH
￿￿
Then we can write H = ￿MhH, where
￿M =
h
zWA
1￿￿
M + zH
i1=(1￿￿)
the unit cost of H is therefore
b ! =
wWAMhH + wHhH
￿MhH
=
wWAM + wH
￿M
19. This is useful because now we can write the results for married couples using the solution for
singles . The Lagrangian for the married couple￿ s problem is:
L = b !H + peq + ￿M
h
gM ￿ e1￿￿
q H￿
i
.
Therefore the optimal aggregated home time H is given by
H (b !;p) = gM
￿
p
b !
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿￿
. This implies
Lemma 5 The optimal home labor time of the husband is
hH =
H
￿M
=
gM
￿M
￿
p
b !
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿￿
=
gM
￿M
￿
p
b !
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿￿
and that of the wife is
hW = AMhH = gM AM
￿M
￿
p
b !
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿￿
.
The input demands are linear in the home constraint, but the relation to wages and the equip-
ment price is quite complicated. The model therefore implies the following relations of parameters
to observables:
1. The elasticity of home-work hours of singles to wages is 1 ￿ ￿
@
@ logw
logh￿
i (wi;p) = 1 ￿ ￿
2. The elasticity of the husband-wife work ratio to the wage ratio is ￿
@
@ logw
log
hW
hH
= ￿
5 Computation
The model￿ s solution is computed using a standard numerical strategy. Given tax rates, wages
and technology parameters, it is easy to solve the model directly for the optimal home-production
decisions, as outlined above, and these in turn imply the full income by household type. Given
preference parameters and the Pareto weight ￿; it would be easy to compute the allocations of
leisure and consumption of married household if the tax rates were constant. Unfortunately, with
progressive taxation, the tax rate depends on the labor income of the household, and hence on
20the leisure allocations. This problem is therefore solved by guessing the labor income (and hence
the tax rate), solving for the leisure allocation, and updating the guess until we have guessed the
correct labor income, given ￿: Thus the static components of the model are easily solved.
The Pareto weight ￿ depends on the continuation values of married versus single, which in
turn depend on the marriage and divorce thresholds
￿
"M;"D￿
. The solution strategy is to solve for
￿; given guesses on
￿
"M;"D￿
and associated approximations for the values V M
i of being married,
as functions of ". Given these value-function approximations, we search over the unit simplex
in R2 to ￿nd a pair
￿
"M;"D￿
of stationary marriage and divorce rates. This means that under
the hypothesis that they describe marriage and divorce in the future, they are generated by the
optimal marriage/divorce decisions today. The approximations to the value functions are then
updated by recomputing the value of marriage at the new values of
￿
"M;"D￿
: This procedure
converges monotonically in the euclidean norm to a ￿xed point for
￿
"M;"D￿
: At the ￿xed point,
all of the equilibrium conditions hold, by construction. This procedure is explained in more detail
in the appendix.
6 Understanding the Trends in Paid Work
We now calibrate the model with two di⁄erent parameter sets: one to match statistics from 1975
and one to match statistics from 2003. We will refer to the pair of parameterizations collectively
as the "benchmark" model, and will use it to answer the questions posed in the introduction.
The overall calibration of the model can be divided into three phases. First there is the cali-
bration of the home technology, then the preferences over leisure, and ￿nally the marriage-market
equilibrium. Due to the separability between leisure and home-production allocations in the model,
the home-technology phase does not require information about preferences or marriage-market equi-
libria. These parameters are therefore set to make the model match statistical targets concerning
time spent in home production by family type. The calibrated technology converts wage obser-
vations into measures of full income y by household type, net of home production costs. This in
turn allows us to compute the share of spending on leisure for each household member; the total
spending implies a value for the preference parameter ￿. In the case of married couples, the ratio
of leisure spending on each spouse reveals the required value of the husband￿ s Pareto weight ￿
required to match the leisure allocation. In this way we arrive ￿nally at the indirect utility ￿ ow for
each type of household.
That leaves the marriage-market calibration. We shall require the model￿ s equilibrium to match
some measures of ￿ ows in and out of marriage, as well as the relative leisure lW=lH.
6.1 Reconciliation of time-use survey to CPS Hours
The calibration targets for married-couple￿ s hours are taken from Table 4, discussed previously.
Since the object of the analysis is to analyze the trends in paid hours in the CPS data, the ￿rst
21step is to reconcile paid work hours in the time-use data with those in the CPS. Table 4 shows how
this is done. For each sex-marital -status group, the table lists under ￿ Time-Survey￿the values for
weekly hours of paid and unpaid work for the years 1975 and 2003. The next column, ￿ Adjusted to
CPS￿ , lists the paid weekly hours from the CPS. The other hours numbers in this column re￿ ect the
reallocation of the deviation in paid hours to home work and non-working time. The reallocation
rule is proportional; where the time surveys report an excess of paid hours, the fraction allocated
to unpaid work equals the ratio of unpaid to paid work. These adjustments are mostly quite small,
except that paid work is 3.5 hours too high for husbands in 1975 in the time-use surveys, and 4
hours too for single men in 2003. The table also breaks down unpaid work into two categories:
home production, and work-related time, which involves commuting and unpaid time at work, such
as meals. The hours in this table will now be used to calibrate the model.
6.2 Home Technology
To calibrate the home technology, consider the expenditure share of home equipment. The NIPA
series for equipment and furniture spending, as shown in Figure 4(a), appears to ￿ uctuate between
4 and 6 per cent of total consumption. Part (b) of the diagram, shows that the price index for
equipment has been falling rapidly relative to the CPI. 5 The target for the model is an expenditure
share equal to 5.0%. This is used to pin down ￿ = 0:924; the labor share in home technology.
We saw earlier that the home-production technology implies that the elasticity of the husband-
wife work ratio to the wage ratio is ￿; which we set by using cross-sectional data (assuming away
marital assortment on z): We showed above that the elasticity of the husband-wife work ratio to
the wage ratio equals ￿. This cannot be estimated directly on the 2003 time-use data because
there is only one time-use questionnaire per household. However since the survey is linked to the
CPS, we can impute the spouse￿ s home labor by projecting home labor time in the ATUS on the
CPS variables. Using this imputed measure of the spouse￿ s home labor, the estimated elasticity is
￿ = 0:86 when controlling for employment status of the spouses and age. As a robustness check,
we can carry out a direct estimation on the 1985 survey, which has a small, non-representative
husband-wife component with reports of home hours for both spouses. The parameter estimate
turns out to be ￿ = 0:83. When not controlling for employment status, the elasticity estimate falls,
but only 0.77. The estimates are so close, there is hardly a need to choose between them, so we
take the central estimate and set ￿ = 0:83. The full results tables for these regression exercises are
shown in Table A2.
The parameter values for the home technology are summarized in Table 5. We normalize zH = 1
in both years. Given the values for (￿;￿;zH), we set zW in each period to match the husband-wife
work ratio hW=hH: The remaining technological parameters are the home-production levels. These
5Note in the ￿gure that the relative prices of goods that might be part of a broader de￿nition of home equipment,
such as cars, services or even housing, have been quite stable when compared to the price of home equipment, which
justi￿es calibrating to spending on the narrow NIPA de￿nition.
22are set so that the model matches the home time averages for 1975 and 2003. For married couples
the values gM
1975 = 41:98 and gM
2003 = 12:78 solve the inversion of the home constraint:
gM
t = b hWtK￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
wWt + wHtAMt
pt
￿￿1￿￿
. Similarly for single men, the levels are gH
1975 = 0:085 and gH
2003 = 0:115;while for single women, we
get gW
1975 = 0:289 and gW
2003 = 0:199. This rise in gH allows the exercise to account for the failure
of hS
M to fall over time as a shift in tastes for housework on the part of single men.
The match between targets and model results for this parameter set is shown in Table 6. The
only mismatch occurs for the home-equipment share of consumption expenditure, which in the
model increases slightly, from 4.1% to 4.3%, while in the data it declines slightly, from 5.6% to
4.6%. Further work is needed to clarify the reasons for the mis-match, but given the small share
1 ￿ ￿ of equipment in production, resolving this is unlikely to a⁄ect the results qualitatively.
This technology implies that a household incurs a ￿xed cost largely in terms of labor time. In
Greenwood and Guner (2004), households are subject to a non-substitutable pecuniary ￿xed cost
that is set to 13% of the male wage in 1950, in addition to whatever home production takes place.
This implies considerable economic gains from marriage. According to the BLS, real compensation
per hour worked roughly doubled between 1950 and 1975, which would suggest a ￿xed cost for
singles of 6:5% of the real wage in 1975, while for married household it would be 13%.6
From the March CPS, we have labor income and total personal income for the whole sample
in every year. The wage is computed as the ratio of labor income to hours worked and averaged
each year over the population aged 18-65 of each sex. This results in the estimates reported
in Table A4 in the appendix and imply a growth of real wages of 19% over the period. Non-
wage compensation, which is excluded from the CPS measure, also grew rapidly over the period.
According to Meisenheimer (May 2005), analysis of the National Compensation Survey reveals that
total compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector actually grew 32% between 1979 and
2003, the excess over reported wage growth being due to a 55% growth in bene￿ts.
For each household type, the wage plus the average hours spent on home production, is used
to compute the cost of home production, given the parameters of the home production function,
￿;￿;zF. This is done on the basis of the net wage, which equals the gross wage, less the cost of
working tn. This cost in turn equals the average time spent in unpaid work-related activities, as
reported in Table 5 for the two calibration years, 1975 and 2003, which implies tn = 0:18 in 1975
and 0:11 in 2003.7
We take non-labor income to be the excess of total personal income over reported labor income.
The mean estimates, reported in Table A4 in the appendix in terms of ratios to mean full labor
income;i.e. the sum of the observed wages, are on the order of 4% for married and 6% for singles. In
6The series is title Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour (COMPRNFB), and is available at
the FRED data bank of the St,. Louis Fed. The URL is http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/COMPRNFB/
7As unpaid hours data is not available from the CPS, it is not possible to report an annual series.
23aggregate, macro economists usually ￿nd non-labor income to be about a third of GDP. Supposing
our population to be representative of the economy as a whole this would lead us to expect non-
labor income to average about 10% of full income, so the CPS measurements appear to be quite
low. This may be explained by mis-measurement or by exclusion from the sample of the older
population, which is likely to have a particularly high share of non-labor income.
Full income Y of the household is set equal to the sum of the wage and non-labor income for
the head, and where present, the spouse, less the cost of home production and the ￿xed cost of
households, as represented by the parameter ￿.
The tax function is taken from Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2008). This is a two-parameter
function:
T (y) = (￿0 + ￿1 ln(y=￿ y))
, where the average tax rate for the household with average income ￿ y equals ￿0 and the marginal tax
rate ￿0+￿1: The function is ￿tted for 1970 and 2000 to IRS data on average tax rates by income of
the household and ￿ling type. 8 For married couples in 1970 the coe¢ cients are (0:096;0:0814) and
in 2000 (0:1023;0:0733), while for singles they are (0:1597;0:0857) in 1970 and (0:1547;0:0497) in
2000. The tax functions are normalized by average household income in each year. Note that the
marginal tax rate for the married household with average income is roughly 0.18 in both 1970 and
2000, re￿ ecting the fact that the decline of marginal tax rates so often discussed in the literature
on female labor supply was short-run phenomenon, following on from an equally short run-up in
tax rates in the 1970s.
6.3 Preferences
From 1975 to 2003, the expenditure share of leisure declined for married couples. To match this,
we turn to separable CES preferences; for each spouse i in a marriage, utility is given by:
u(cP;ci;li) = ￿
c1￿￿
P ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
c1￿￿
i ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿
l1￿￿
i ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
. Under these preferences, the expenditure share of leisure for married couples is given by
wWlW + wHlH
Y T
M (1 ￿ TA) ￿ peq
= ￿1=￿B (￿)
A(￿)
, where
A(￿) ￿ ￿1=￿ +
h
(1 ￿ ￿)
1=￿ + ￿1=￿
i
(1 ￿ ￿)
1=￿
B (￿) ￿
￿
1 + tn
1 ￿ TM
￿1=￿ h
w
1￿1=￿
W (1 ￿ ￿)
1=￿ + w
1￿1=￿
H ￿1=￿
i
8I am grateful to Remzi Kayusz for supplying the 1970 coe¢ cients. The historical data is available for 1916-1999
at the IRS web Statistics on Income web site:
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0￿ id=223808,00.html
24, and TM and TA are the marginal and average tax rates, respectively. As we saw earlier, given ￿;
the Pareto weights ￿ are pinned down by the observed leisure ratios and wages:
￿ =
1
1 + wW
wH (lW=lH)
￿
With ￿ = 0:5 set arbitrarily, it requires ￿ = 0:79 and ￿ = 1:24 to match the expenditure share of
leisure each year.
Non-working time is signi￿cantly higher in the data for singles than for married people; on
average, singles get 70 hours of weekly non-working time, compared to as low as 60 hours for
married men in 2003. To ensure that the model matches the leisure share of expenditure for each
household type in each year, we adjust the ratio of non-labor income to full labor income for
the single households, and then o⁄set the e⁄ect on utility so that this adjustment cannot a⁄ect
marriage/divorce decisions. The actual and adjusted ratios are reported below in Table 7. By
construction therefore, the calibrated model will match the time allocations of singles and leisure-
expenditure shares of married.
6.4 Bargaining and the marriage-market
For any given year, the aggregate output of the marriage-market model consists of marriage rates
￿M , divorce rates ￿D; and the relative leisure lW=lH: The marriage-market calibration involves
setting some parameters arbitrarily and then setting the remaining free parameters so that the
model output matches the empirical analogs.
Because o¢ cial estimates of the empirical marriage and divorce hazard rates not available after
1995, these are computed instead from the annual transitions in the distribution marital status in
the March CPS according to a simple procedure described in the appendix. This ensures that the
hazard rates are consistent with the population fractions. The resulting estimates are:
1975 2003
￿M 0.0929 0.0458
￿D 0.0249 0.0178
.
The free parameters of the marriage model are set so that the steady states of the model match
the marriages rates for both years, the divorce rate for 1975 , and the relative leisure of spouses:
1.03 for 1975 and 1.02 for 2003. The parameters in question are the joy of single life (qm;qf);the
divorce cost dc, and the weight ￿ the model puts on the bargaining solution versus a ￿xed Pareto
weight. We compute for a given marriage both the egalitarian solution ￿E and a "￿xed" Pareto
weight ￿F that is allowed to change only if required for a marriage with positive surplus to form or
continue, as in models of limited commitment, such as Thomas and Worrall (1988). The husband￿ s
pareto weight is thus given by the sum: ￿ = ￿￿E + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F: The value of ￿F is set to 0.588,
the average of that required for matching relative leisure in each of the calibration years, so this
25procedure yields a natural measure ￿ of the distance from the unitary model required to match the
statistical targets.
The other parameters, whose values are ￿xed arbitrarily, are the share of public goods in utility,
set to ￿ = 0:1 ￿" the standard deviation of marriage quality ", set to 1.0, .and the persistence ￿
of match quality, set to 0.95: The high persistence is required to allow divorce rates to fall when
marriage rates rise.
7 Results
The calibration procedure results in a tight ￿t between model and data for the two years, as is easily
seen in Table 9, which reports the marriage and divorce rates and the allocations of leisure and
paid work across household types. The parameters that generated this are shown in Table 8. The
most interesting of course is the weight ￿ = 0:361 that the model puts on the bargaining solution,
which shows that the calibration requires a sharp deviation from the unitary model assumption.
Figure 5 compares the time series in the data with a synthetic-trend prediction from the model.
The synthetic trend combines inputs from time series data, such as wages, equipment prices and
non-labor income, with piecewise linear trends for inputs whose values are only available at a few
points in time, such as tax-rate coe¢ cients, which are based on the work of Kaygusuz (2010),
and the home-productivity parameters, which are generated in the Benchmark model for 1975
and 2003. The model is solved for time-allocations in each year, conditional on these exogenous
variables. The results in panel (a) shows that the synthetic and empirical trends for paid weekly
hours of married couples are roughly in sync; deviations are naturally smallest at the endpoints
and largest in the middle years, a pattern that is echoed in panel (b), where the deviations appear
larger for the single-women households. The overall changes are of course accurately re￿ ected by
the calibration, while the deviations, driven in part by the arbitrary interpolation of the forcing
variables, are without consequence for the exercises in comparing steady states that follow.
7.1 Experiments
The goal of the experiments is to measure the relative importance for marriage and paid labor hours
of the historically-changing variables that we take as exogenous, such as wages, the equipment price
and the e⁄ective tax rate of working wives. The idea is that for each experiment, all variables and
parameters are ￿xed at the values for the 1975 benchmark, except for the variables that particular
experiment is concerned with; these variables are set to their values in the 2003 benchmark.
Each column for Table 10 reports the values for 2003 that would have held had the variable in
the column title been the only change between the two periods. The net change in the outcome of a
given row between 1975 and the experiment column is therefore a measure of the importance of the
variables in question for explaining time-allocation trends. To assess the importance of bargaining
and home production for the result, the experiments are repeated in Tables 10(b) and 10(c); in
26Table 10(b), the pareto weight ￿ is held constant, and in Table 10(c), the home-production inputs
are held constant. In the Relative Wage experiment, the husband￿ s wage is held constant at the
1975 level, and the wife￿ s raised so that the wage ratio is the same as in 2003. In the equipment
price experiment, the price drops from the 1975 value to the 2003 value. In the Income Tax column,
the parameters governing the taxes paid by married and single are replaced by those for 2003. In
the Wage and Income Growth experiment, the relative wage is held constant at the 1975 ratio, but
the observed growth of hourly compensation is imposed, so that the husband￿ s wage matches the
2003 value, while the wife￿ s is lower. Non-labor income is set to match the observed increase in
non-labor income from the CPS.
In all three tables the ￿rst column of results, labelled 1975, is identical, and represents the
benchmark calibration for that year. In Table 10(a) the column labelled ￿ 2003￿similarly indicates
the benchmark calibration for that year, while in the following tables, it represents the e⁄ect of
holding either the Pareto weight (Table 10(b)) or the home-time allocation (Table 10(c)) constant,
evaluated at the benchmark￿ s parameter values for 2003 . Comparing across these three tables,
the ￿ 2003￿columns reveal that abstracting from bargaining is a much more serious problem than
abstracting from home production. In Table 10(b), women￿ s labor supply soars to more than 10
hours above the Benchmark level of 23.2 hours, while in Table 10(c), holding home-time constant
is shown to have an impact on the order of 15 minutes on weekly paid hours. Since the reasons for
the impact of bargaining have been discussed in the theory section, it su¢ ces to note that despite
the fact that the calibrated model allows for a much more articulated model, and a much larger
set of driving forces, the impact of bargaining is of the same order of magnitude as in the rough
calculations made earlier with the simpli￿ed example.
7.2 Explaining The Trends in Married-Couple￿ s Time Allocations
On its own, the rise in women￿ s relative wage can explain 77% of the increase in married-women￿ s
labor supply, a shift of more than 7 hours weekly, and wage growth (holding the relative wage
constant) can explain 52%, a shift of 4.8 hours. By contrast, the decline of the equipment price
accounts for 33% of the increase in married-women￿ s labor supply, and tax reform can account
for 26%. All four of these potential explanations turned out to be quantitatively important, and
qualitatively consistent with the work of Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) in the ￿rst case,
Greenwood and Guner (2004) in the next two, and with respect to taxes, Eissa (1995) and the
rapidly growing literature summarized in Kaygusuz (2010).
In light of the fact that Greenwood and Guner (2004) assume away the leisure margin, it
is interesting to note that the calibration implies that of the 4-hour decline in married-women￿ s
home hours generated by the declining equipment price, only about 15% is lost to a rise in leisure
(comparable to working costs , which consume about 11% of the liberated time). However the
equipment price fall causes husband￿ s home production time to fall by more than an hour, instead
of increasing as in the data, which results in a 7 hour discrepancy relative to 2003. So the rise in
27husband￿ s hours is working to limit the role of the equipment price in the calibration.
7.3 How important is bargaining?
In Table 10, the columns labelled ￿ 2003￿allow us to compare the unitary and collective versions of
the model, so as to measure the impact of bargaining on the results at the macro level. Its quite
clear from comparing the two tables that the impact of bargaining on the wife￿ s labor supply is
by far the greatest in the analysis of relative wages. Paid work for the wife rises nearly 9 hours
more than in the benchmark, so the impact of relative wages accounts for almost all (90%) of the
discrepancy between the unitary and the bargaining version of the model.
In the simple examples, it was shown that a stable relative-leisure ratio was consistent with
a model where bargaining o⁄set the impact of the change in the relative wage. The results for
non-working time in Table 10(a) show that the story is not so simple in the calibrated model; the
ratio of wife￿ s to husband￿ s non-working time actually falls from 1.03 to 0.93 in response to the rise
in the wife￿ s wage. Table 10(b) shows that this decline would have been much larger in the unitary
version of the model, so bargaining clearly has a large bite here, but it is not enough to explain
the stability of the relative-leisure ratio. Table 10(a) shows that the ratio tends to be driven up by
economic growth, which on its own would have driven relative leisure up to 1.10. It is clear from
Table 10(b) that this e⁄ect mostly operates through bargaining, as the ratio here falls to 1.05. This
is the result of concavity of the utility function, which implies that growth has a stronger e⁄ect on
the welfare of single women than on that of single men. 9 As with the relative wage, the key is the
elasticity of the pareto weight to the outside option.
Even at the most aggregate level, intra-household bargaining appears to play a signi￿cant role.
The ￿rst row of Table 12, derived from Table 10(a), shows that the average paid-labor supply of
married people rises in the benchmark model from 24.1 weekly hours to 29.5. The experiment
columns show that the relative wages,. the equipment price and the income tax reform seem to
be equally important on their own, each generate an increase of roughly 2.5 hours. However the
middle rows, based on Table 10(b), shows that with a constant Pareto weight, paid work per couple
rises by 5 additional hours, all of which is driven by the response to relative wages. The unitary
version of the model as we saw already gets this wrong in terms of relative work hours, but here
we learn that it also gets the average work hours seriously wrong, which has strong implications
for per-capita hours, as Figure 1 made clear.
9The CPS results in Table 7 imply non-labor income fell from 13.7% of labor income to 8.4% for single women on
average, while it remained constant for single men at 8.3% . Therefore the growth result is not driven by disparities
in the growth rates as these have an opposing e⁄ect.
287.4 Explaining the Decline of Marriage
Over the period 1975-2003, the annual marriage rate per single women fell from 9% to 4.5%. The
divorce rate per marriage also fell, from 2% to 1.8%. Can the model￿ s experiments shed light on
the causes of the marriage-rate decline? Column 2 of Table 11 shows that the model can explain a
decline from 9.1% to 6.4% per year; about 60% of the total decline in marriage. Three elements in
the calibration are required for this; a high persistence of marriage quality (￿ = 0:95), a low share
of public goods in marriage (￿ = 0:1) and high ￿xed cost of establishing a household (x = 0:15).
The ￿rst row shows that income and wage growth on its own can explain 50% of the observed
decline in the marriage rate.
Convergence of the relative wage explains about 20% of the total decline in marriage in the
model; this is obviously much less important than growth, but far more important than the e⁄ects
of the equipment-price trend or the tax reforms; the former reduces marriage rates by 2%, while the
e⁄ect of the tax reform is to increase marriage rates very slightly, by about 4%. In Greenwood and
Guner (2004), the fall in equipment price plays a more important role in the decline of marriage
than it does here. The di⁄erence may well be due to the time period considered; they analyze
events since 1945, while the analysis here begins in 1975. As we saw earlier, the relative stability
in the home hours of single persons over the later period limits the role that can be assigned to
technology-based arguments such as the price trend.
The middle rows show the impact on marriage rates of the same changes when the bargaining
is shut down (￿ is constant). The marriage rate in the benchmark model falls an additional 1.6
percentage points, down to 4.8%. The impact of the equipment-price trend and the tax reforms
are now much larger; the former drives the marriage rate down a further two percentage points
to 7.1%, while the latter, now causes the marriages rate to fall 2 points, instead of gaining a half
point.
The model appears to have no problem accounting for the decline in divorce rates; with high
persistence, the quality of married couples is higher when marriage rates fall, so the divorce risk is
correspondingly lower.
Abstracting from bargaining therefore not only increases the apparent instability of marriage10,
but also severely distorts the marriage-decline story, giving a spuriously high importance to tax
reform and the equipment price trend and making each of these causes look more important than
the e⁄ect of wage convergence.
7.5 Discussion
The bargaining model proposed here relies on a bargaining solution with divorce threat-points, but
the same argument could apply to other bargaining models, provided that the bargaining positions
10Recall that what is meant by ￿ constant ￿￿here allows the Pareto weight to shift if required to ensure e¢ cient
marriage or separations. Therefore the e⁄ect of ￿xing ￿ does not in itself cause ine¢ cient marital outcomes.
29of the spouses are increasing in their own wages. It should also be noted that there are two strong
empirical justi￿cations for divorce threat-points. First, data about the lives of singles, such as
labor supply, wages and marriage rates, can be used, in combination with a suitable model of
single life, to estimate the threat-points. In this paper, these threat-points are determined in the
marriage-market equilibrium, as remarriage plays an important role in the value of being single.
Second, the estimation results of Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) at the micro level imply
that household labor supply is better described by a bargaining model with divorce threat-points
than one with non-cooperative marriage as a threat-point.
The model is simple enough that it is easily extended to accommodate concerns outside the
scope of the current paper. According to Ventura and Bachrach (2000), the fraction of child births
accounted for by unmarried women has increased from 10 per cent in 1970 to nearly 35 per cent
today. This suggests a big part of the marriage trend may be due to child costs falling for single
women relative to married women. This trend may be due to pecuniary factors, such as welfare
transfers to single mothers, or to non-pecuniary, such as a decline in the stigma associated with
single motherhood. These ideas are pursued in a related paper in progress, Kennes and Knowles
(2008), which argues that by adding utility for children to the model, and the assumption that the
costs of children are largely in terms of the parent￿ s time, the model can replicate the rise in single
women￿ s fertility and the decline of married people￿ s share of births.
8 Conclusion
Standard explanations of rising female labor supply have strong implications for husband￿ s time
allocations that have not been explored. In particular, both the closing of the gender wage gap and
rising home productivity imply that the leisure of husbands should be increasing strongly relative
to that of wives. Time-use data in the US suggest that this is not so, and this is consistent with
other work which argues that relative leisure around the world is independent of relative wages.
Allowing for bargaining between spouses is a simple way to reconcile the trends in time allocation
with the usual driving forces proposed in the literature.
The analysis also identi￿ed a new mechanism for explaining marriage decline, through the
closing of the gender gap in wages. While the calibrated model suggests economic growth is the
main cause of the decline in marriage rates over the period 1970-2003, the e⁄ect of relative wage
convergence generates about 20% of decline in the model.
Are macro-economists mistaken in ignoring bargaining between spouses? Quantitatively, the
impact of allowing for household bargaining turned out to be very large at the level of labor supply
by sex, on the order of 10 weekly hours, nearly 30% of married-men￿ s (paid) labor supply. Even at
the most aggregate level, the over-prediction of per-capita labor supply resulting from re-allocation
of leisure was signi￿cant, amounting to about 2 weekly hours, or 40% of the change since 1975. Of
the four exogenous shocks studied here, the importance of bargaining e⁄ects turned out to be at
30least as large as those driven by the time allocated to home production in all except for the case of
the equipment price trend. This suggests that household bargaining, which is the subject of a mere
handful of macro papers, may be at least as important for understanding labor supply as home
production, which has been a major topic in macro for twenty years. Abstracting from bargaining
was also seen to distort the analysis of the marriage-rate decline, exaggerating particularly the role
of the equipment-price trend.
The integration of marriage and home-production into a model of intra-household allocation was
essential for the insights presented here. Since singles are likely to transit into marriage, the e⁄ect
of higher wages on the allocation of leisure cannot be determined without taking into account the
e⁄ect on the value of being single, relative to married, which is determined in the marriage-market
equilibrium. The labor supply of married men, which has been largely neglected because of the
very stability we analyze here,therefore turns out to be informative about the types of model, and
ultimately, the types of explanations, that can account for the trends in married-women￿ s labor
supply and in marriage rates.
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33Single 24.22
Married 11.79
Single 25.71
Married 39.44
Single 22.54
Married 13.76
Single 24.52
Married 38.60
Single 23.07
Married 16.73
Single 25.13
Married 35.74
Single 24.89
Married 21.36
Single 27.20
Married 36.20
Single 25.95
Married 23.47
Single 28.22
Married 37.30
Single 24.67
Married 22.97
Single 26.52
Married 36.01
Years Sample
Weekly 
Hours
Per-
Capita 
1962-66
Women 
25.24
Men
1967-75
Women 
25.37
Men
1976-85
Women 
25.45
Men
1986-96
Women 
27.69
Men
1997-2001
Women 
29.01
Men
Table 1: Trends in Paid Hours Per Capita, March CPS ages 18-65
2002-2006
Women 
27.84
Men
34Wives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
Discretionary Time 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
Paid Work 11.54 42.07 14.8 38.17 17.6 35.51 21.82 38.2
Unpaid Work 45.28 19.4 36.79 17.91 35.6 21.32 32.32 20.29
Total Working Time 56.82 61.47 51.59 56.08 53.2 56.83 54.14 58.49
Non-Working Time  61.18 56.53 66.41 61.92 64.8 61.17 63.86 59.51
Sample Size 739 696 697 655 1122 966 4116 3774
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
2.71 6.54 2.02 4.06
21.31 1.98 14.86 3.33
6.18 3.8 6.55 4.24
2.36 4.53 4.06 7.01
4.23 1.06 4.83 1.65
Total Unpaid Work 36.79 17.91 32.32 20.29
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
34.5 33.07 32.43 35.51
Net Personal Care 25.4 23.31 24.44 20.12
6.51 5.54 6.99 3.88
66.41 61.92 63.86 59.51
Variables
Table 2(a).  Time allocation of married couples . Author's computations from married people aged 18-65 in time-use surveys. Observations 
with more than 4 weekly hours unaccounted for  excluded.
Variables
Commute+Job-
Related
2003 1965 1975 1985
Table 2(b) Composition of Unpaid Work  . Author's computations from married 
people aged 18-65 in time-use surveys. 
1975 2003
1975 2003
Variables
Cooking and Indoor 
Chores
Other Home 
Production
Shopping
Child Care
"Leisure 1"
Table 2(c ) Composition of Non-Working Time.  Author's computations from 
married people aged 18-65 in time-use surveys. "Leisure 1" refers to variable 
defined in  Aguiar & Hurst (2006).
Other Non-Working 
Time
Total Non-Working 
Time 
3562-66 67-74 75-84 85-94 95-00 2000-06
18-24 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.92 0.91 0.90
25-54 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.74 0.76 0.75
55-56 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.64 0.63 0.66
Education
< HS 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.71 0.74 0.75
HS 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.73 0.76 0.76
College 0.58 0.60 0.66 0.75 0.76 0.75
BA 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.72 0.69
1965 1975 1985 2003
Less than 12 1.08 1.02 1.08 1.01
12 Years 1.06 1.14 1.03 1.06
13-15 years 1.20 0.98 1.03 1.08
16 or more 1.01 1.07 1.11 1.10
0.89 0.97 1.01 1.04
25-55 0.83 0.94 1.03 1.04
55-70 1.12 1.01 0.95 1.06
Age
Table 3(b): Non-Working Time of Married People . Author's Computations from the time-use 
surveys.
Subsample
Wife-Husband Ratios of Non-Working Time
Years of 
Education
Working
Table 3(a): Female-Male Wage Ratios by Age and Education . Author's computations from the CPS 
population of people aged 18-65 who worked at least 10 hours weekly on average.
Years
Age
36Time-
Survey
Adjusted to 
CPS
Time-
Survey
Adjusted to 
CPS
Time-
Survey
Adjusted to 
CPS
Time-
Survey
Adjusted to 
CPS
Paid Work 19.24 21.42 27.47 26.30 15.51 14.31 38.73 35.23
Job-Related 3.72 3.86 4.86 4.73 2.72 2.58 6.48 6.34
Home Production 24.27 23.05 9.82 10.13 34.27 35.10 11.49 12.29
Total Work 47.23 48.33 42.15 41.16 52.49 51.98 56.7 53.86
Non-Working Hours 70.77 69.67 75.85 76.84 65.51 66.02 61.3 64.14
Time-Survey Freq.
CPS Population Share
Paid Work 24.17 24.36 29.02 26.30 18.24 18.97 36.26 36.02
Job-Related 4.62 4.38 5.3 4.73 3.23 3.41 6.21 6.48
Home Production 21.01 20.92 12.13 12.93 32.82 32.35 15.29 15.36
Total Work 49.8 49.67 46.45 43.97 54.28 54.74 57.76 57.86
Non-Working Hours 68.2 68.33 71.55 74.03 63.72 63.26 60.24 60.14
Time-Survey Freq.
CPS Population Share
Paid Work 24.83 24.59 30.28 26.40 22.54 23.05 38.87 35.94
Job-Related 2.64 2.70 3.68 2.90 2.08 2.54 4.1 3.95
Home Production 20.53 20.64 11.88 12.97 30.74 30.45 16.59 17.47
Total Work 47.99 47.93 45.83 42.28 55.35 56.03 59.57 57.36
Non-Working Hours 70.01 70.07 72.17 75.72 62.65 61.97 58.43 60.64
Time-Survey Freq.
CPS Population Share
Table 4: Reconciliation of  Working Hours from Time-Use Surveys to CPS Paid Work Time. Averages weighted by CPS population distribution. 
Adjustment includes reallocating paid work hours to, or from, unpaid work and non-work to match CPS paid hours.
12.12 13.87 37.78 36.23
18.02 33.47 31.99
2003
3912
1975
Married
250 149 719 671
Women Men
3347
19.55
2405
Weekly Hours
Singles
Women Men
4238
20.94 30.34
1985
29.17
719 559 1158 990
16.51
371975 2003
0.115 0.081 Home Production single male g
H
0.215 0.289  Home Production single female g
SW
42.145 16.191 Home Production  married g
M
1.752 1.256 Womens Home Productivity zW
Home-Labor share of output θ
Substitutability of spouse's home labor  ρ
Model Data Model Data
35.1 35.1 30.45 30.45 wifes home time 
12.29 12.29 17.47 17.47 husbands home time
24.75 24.75 22.29 22.29 single womens home time
11.67 11.67 14.67 14.67 single mens home time 
0.04072 0.056 0.04271 0.046 equipment share 
Table 6: Home production model results and empirical targets. 
Table 5: Technology parameters for benchmark Model
Weekly Hours in Home Production
1975 2003
Value
0.83
0.924
Parameter
38CPS Model CPS Model
Married 68.1% 63.5%
Single Male 71.9% 8.3% 12.5% 71.3% 8.3% 30.1%
Single Female 76.0% 13.7% 26.5% 72.9% 8.4% 27.2%
Calibrated parameters
0.84 female/male joy of single life
2.3 level of joy of single life
1.2 divorce cost
0.36 weight on Egalitarian solution
Normalized parameters
1 std. deviation of marriage quality
1.817 leisure utility: delta
0.1 public goods share of utility
Data Model Data Model
0.093 0.093 0.046 0.064 marriage rate
0.025 0.025 0.018 0.015 divorce rate
1.029 1.031 1.022 1.016 non-working time: wife/husband
66.02 65.58 61.97 61.66 non  working time: wives
64.14 63.63 60.64 60.68 non  working time: husbands
14.30 14.18 23.05 23.23 paid working time: wives
35.23 35.03 35.94 35.79 paid working time: husbands
67.98 67.98 68.41 68.41 non  working time: single women
75.29 75.29 74.03 74.03 non  working time: single men
21.42 21.37 24.59 24.55 paid working time: single women
26.30 26.29 26.40 26.37 paid working time: single men
Household type
Table 7 : Expenditure share of leisure and Non-Labor Income as a fraction of full earnings. Computed 
from CPS. Income in model  is adjusted so that model  matches expenditure share of leisure by household 
type. 
1975 2003
Leisure/Y Leisure/Y
Non-LabInc/YFL Non-LabInc/YFL
4.6% 7.3%
Statistic
Table 9: Empirical targets and results for benchmark calibration.
Parameter
1975 2003
Value
Table 8: Benchmark-Model parameter set
39paid working time: wives     13.748 23.164 20.965 16.568 16.200 13.970
paid working time: husbands  34.612 35.836 32.114 36.701 37.204 37.808
non-working time: wife/husband       1.030 1.018 0.929 1.057 1.036 1.099
home-production time: wives             35.100 30.450 32.003 31.240 34.978 34.272
home-production time: husbands       12.290 17.470 14.063 10.939 12.247 12.000
non  working time: wives     66.041 61.738 60.651 66.597 63.319 66.653
non  working time: husbands  64.104 60.637 65.309 62.998 61.105 60.638
paid working time: wives     13.748 36.566 29.134 16.626 15.489 15.538
paid working time: husbands  34.6116 31.843 27.408 36.643 37.447 37.168
non-working time: wife/husband       1.0302 0.720 0.720 1.055 1.055 1.056
home-production time: wives             35.1 30.443 32.003 31.240 34.978 34.272
home-production time: husbands       12.29 17.466 14.063 10.939 12.247 12.000
non  working time: wives     66.0414 46.869 51.012 66.529 64.158 64.801
non  working time: husbands  64.1037 65.073 70.862 63.066 60.818 61.392
Table 10(b): Computational experiments with Pareto weight held constant.
paid working time: wives     13.748 22.577 18.497 15.857 16.103 13.109
paid working time: husbands  34.6116 40.439 33.671 36.758 37.173 37.727
non-working time: wife/husband       1.0302 0.951 0.927 1.033 1.036 1.106
home-production time: wives             35.1 35.100 35.100 35.100 35.100 35.100
home-production time: husbands       12.29 12.290 12.290 12.290 12.290 12.290
non  working time: wives     66.0414 57.745 60.489 63.603 63.313 66.846
non  working time: husbands  64.1037 60.702 65.232 61.589 61.099 60.446
Table 10(c) Computational experiments with home production held constant.
Relative Wage Equip. Price Income Tax
Wage and 
Income Growth
1975 2003
Benchmark Model
Variable
Benchmark Model
1975 2003
Wage and 
Income Growth
Variable
Benchmark Model
1975 2003 Relative Wage Equip. Price
Experiments
Experiments
Table 10 (a): Benchmark Results; Computational Experiments in Benchmark model,.
Relative Wage Equip. Price Income Tax
Wage and 
Income Growth
Variable
Experiments
Income Tax
40marriage rate 0.091 0.064 0.084 0.090 0.096 0.068
divorce rate 0.026 0.015 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.018
marriage rate 0.091 0.048 0.079 0.071 0.076 0.056
divorce rate 0.026 0.016 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.018
marriage rate 0.091 0.063 0.084 0.090 0.096 0.068
divorce rate 0.026 0.015 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.018
Average Paid Hours 29.50 26.54 26.63 26.70 25.89
Share of Total Change 1.00 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.32
Average Paid Hours 34.20 28.27 26.63 26.47 26.35
Share of Total Change 1.88 0.77 0.46 0.43 0.41
Average Paid Hours 31.51 26.08 26.31 26.64 25.42
Share of Total Change 1.38 0.36 0.40 0.46 0.23
Pareto Weight
Benchmark Model Experiments
1975 2003 Relative Wage Equipment Price Income Tax
Wage and Income 
Growth
Statistic
Benchmark Model Experiments
Table 11: Marriage and Divorce Rates: in Benchmark and in Computational Experiments.
Home Time
Outcomes held 
constant
Variable
Outcomes held 
constant
1975 2003 Relative Wage Equip. Price Income Tax
Wage and Income 
Growth
Table 12: Average paid work hours of Married Couples
24.18 Pareto Weight
Home Time
411964-66
1974-76
1984-86
Figure 3: Median wages in the March CPS, by sex
Figure 1(b): Ratio of Mean Wages of Men to those of Women.  Author's computations from the March CPS for population 18-65 
years old working 10 hours or more weekly at paid employment 
Figure 1(a): Per-capita hours in the March CPS. Based on author's computations from reported hours worked in previous week 
by persons aged 18-65. With fitted quartic trend line.
Table 3: Paid Hours of married people: CPS vs Time-
Use surveys for 1965, 1975, 1985 and 2003
Figure 1(c): Per-capita hours by sex and marital status . Based on author's computations from March CPS, persons aged 18-65
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Figure 2a: Weekly Paid Hours of Married Women by Birth Cohort in the March CPS
Figure 2b: Weekly Paid Hours of Married Men by Birth Cohort in the March CPS
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43Figure 4(a): Spending share of Home Equipment in the NIPA , 1972-1997. Source: BEA Table 
2.3.3. Real Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product, Quantity Indexes 
Figure 4(b): Relative Price of Home Equipment and Furniture. Source:  BEA Table 2.3.4. Price 
Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product . 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb   
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44Figure 5(a): Predicted and Actual Paid work of Married Couples. Dashed lines from March CPS; 
thick lines from Benchmark model fitted with piecewise-linear trends
Figure 5(b): Predicted Paid work of Married Couples with Cohort-Specific Pareto Weights.
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